Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key
  distribution by Lütkenhaus, Norbert
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
99
10
09
3v
2 
 2
 F
eb
 2
00
0
Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution
Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus
Helsinki Institute of Physics, PL 9, FIN-00014 Helsingin yliopisto, Finland
(February 1, 2008)
I prove the security of quantum key distribution against
individual attacks for realistic signals sources, including weak
coherent pulses and downconversion sources. The proof ap-
plies to the BB84 protocol with the standard detection scheme
(no strong reference pulse). I obtain a formula for the secure
bit rate per time slot of an experimental setup which can be
used to optimize the performance of existing schemes for the
considered scenario.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The first complete protocol for quantum key distribu-
tion (qkd) has been introduced by Bennett and Bras-
sard in 1984 [1] following earlier ideas by Wiesner [2].
Since then, this protocol (BB84 for short) has been im-
plemented by several groups [3–13]. For an overview
containing more details about the background, the ex-
perimental implementation and the classical evaluation
procedure see for example [7,14–16].
The basic idea of the BB84 protocol is to use a random
string of signal states which, for example, can be realized
as single photons in horizontal, vertical, right circular,
or left circular polarization states. These are two set of
states which are orthogonal within each set, and have
overlap probability 1/2 between the sets. If the receiver
chooses at random between a polarization analyzer for
linear polarization and one for circular polarization, then
they obtain in this way a raw key [17]. From this they
distill the sifted key by publicly exchanging information
about the polarization basis of the signals and the mea-
surement apparatus. They keep only those bits where
the basis is the same for the signal and the measurement,
since those signals give a deterministic relation between
signal and measurement outcome.
The practical implementations deviate from the theo-
retical abstraction used in the original proposal in two
important points. The first is that the signal states do
not have the correct overlap probabilities. Especially
in the photonic realization, the signals contain contribu-
tions from higher photon numbers and from the vacuum
state which cause this deviation. The second point is that
the quantum channel in these implementations (optical
fibers) shows a considerable loss. It has been shown ear-
lier [18,19] that the combination of the two effects open
up a security gap. The extent of this security gap has
been extensively illuminated for different signal sources
in [20] giving necessary conditions on the feasibility of
qkd without restriction to any particular class of eaves-
dropping attacks. From these results one can conclude
that most current experiments are performed in a param-
eter regime where the necessary conditions for security
are violated.
In the present work I will complement these results by
a positive proof of security for a scenario where the power
of the eavesdropper is restricted to attacking signals sep-
arately (individual attack). This restriction allows us to
prove the security for a realistic protocol, i. e. one where
all components are known and work efficiently.
It is necessary to distinguish this work from earlier
work by other groups. Lo and Chau [21] gave a proof
of principle for the security of quantum key distribution.
At present, it is not possible to use their proof to im-
plement secure qkd since the procedure involves devices
to manipulate qubits coherently in order to allow fault-
tolerant computing. The approach of Mayers [22] is cer-
tainly the most advanced result towards practical qkd
which is provably secure against all eavesdropping at-
tacks on the signals. However, the proof assumes ideal
single photon signals, and, at present, we do not have an
extension of that proof which can cope with realistic sig-
nal sources and effective error correction codes, although
work in these directions is in progress.
The restriction to eavesdropping on individual signals
allows a much simpler analysis of a realistic scenario, and
it is therefore advisable to use this scenario as a study
for the generalization in the sense of Mayer’s proof. Fur-
thermore, the results are interesting in their own right:
it seems to be impossible to perform collective measure-
ments on the signals with today’s technology. Therefore,
qkd secure against individual attack will today create
keys which are secure against future developments in co-
herent eavesdropping strategies, since tomorrows tech-
nology cannot be used for todays eavesdropping strat-
egy. This is in contrast to the implication of an increase
of future computation power or improvements in algo-
rithms which threatens todays use of classical encryption
schemes.
In this paper I will derive a formula for the gain of
secure bits per signal sent, that is per time slot of the
experiment. These formulas are presented only in the
limit of long keys, so that the influence of the necessary
authentication of the key and all statistical influences
regarding the number of errors etc. can be neglected. It
is necessary to embed these results into a full protocol,
derived, for example, in [10,23,24] to which I refer the
reader for further details.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II I will in-
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troduce the essential elements of practical quantum cryp-
tography and report the relevant findings for single pho-
ton signals. These results are then extended in Sec. III to
signal sources which generate the signal states by rotat-
ing a state in one polarization to that of the ideal BB84
polarizations. In Sec. IV, the resulting gain formula is ex-
plored for two choices for the signal source, namely weak
coherent pulses (wcp) and parametric downconversion
(pdc). The results are discussed in Sec. V.
II. SECURITY AGAINST INDIVIDUAL
ATTACKS FOR SINGLE PHOTON SOURCES
To investigate the security of qkd one needs to inves-
tigate the trade-off between the information gathered by
the eavesdropper and the amount of disturbance caused
thereby. The trade-off between the Shannon mutual in-
formation and the bit error rate in the sifted key has
been investigated by several author for restricted attacks
[17,25] and for the general individual attack [26]. The
results show that the gathered Shannon information for
the typically observed error rate of about 1–5% is too
high to allow the sifted key to be used directly for cryp-
tographic purposes. However, we can first correct the
errors and then apply the technique of generalized pri-
vacy amplification [27] to distill from the sifted key a
new shorter key, which fulfills the security requirements.
These techniques are purely classical. Both steps, the er-
ror correction and the privacy amplification, will reduce
the number of gained secure bits.
A. Error correction
Error correction is performed by the exchange of re-
dundant information about the key, e.g. in form of par-
ity bits, via the public channel. Since Eve has access
to the public channel, we have to take care of this flow
of side-information. This can be done by using a short
initial shared secret key to encrypt the parity bits in a
one-time pad method. Note that in practice we cannot
realize any public channel which is safe against tamper-
ing by Eve by technology alone. Therefore, sender and
receiver need to share a secret key anyway to overcome
this problem by the classical method of authentication
[28,29]. As a consequence of this method of control of
the side-information, we need to know how many bits
need to be encrypted, which is equivalent to the number
of exchanged parity bits.
It is clear, that one has to be careful to implement an
efficient error correction protocol, since we have to regain
at least the number of secret bits used for the encryption
of the parity bits. The ratio between minimum number
of redundant bits NShannoncorr needed to correct a key of
length n is given according to Shannon [30] by
NShannoncorr
n
= −e log2 e− (1 − e) log2(1− e) , (1)
where e is the observed error rate in the sifted key. In
this limit the probability that the errors can be corrected
can come arbitrarily close to unity. However, Shannon’s
proof of the existence of error correction codes reaching
this limit is not constructive, and the limit is obtained
only by large codes. These are not easily implemented be-
cause of the required computational resources. We have
therefore to search for error correction tools which come
close to this limit. As discussed in [23], it is hard even to
approach the Shannon limit with error correction codes
which use uni-directional classical communication only.
Fortunately, a more efficient bi-directional code exists
[31], which uses f [e] NShannoncorr bits for error correction
with a correction factor f [e] listed in table I.
TABLE I. Example of the performance of the
bi-directional error reconciliation protocol by Brassard and
Salvail [31]. The values are taken from that paper. Here e
is the observed error rate, while f [e] is the ratio of actually
needed redundant bits to the corresponding number of the
Shannon limit. (I used the upper bounds for I(4) provided in
the reference.)
e f [e]
0.01 1.16
0.05 1.16
0.1 1.22
0.15 1.35
B. Generalized privacy amplification
In this section I report on the fraction τ1 of bits by
which we need to shorten the sifted key so that we ob-
tain a secure key. The aim of qkd is to obtain a secure
key in the sense that Eve has no information on that key.
This can be made precise by two properties: 1) a key
x of length nfinal should have equal a priori probability
p(x) = 2−nfinal and 2) the difference between the a priori
and a posteriori probability, as measured by the Shannon
information, should vanish. These two properties can be
summarized in the demand that the expected Shannon
entropyH [〈p(x|M)〉M ] of the a posteriori probability dis-
tribution 〈p(x|M)〉M , after Eve’s gathering of measure-
ment results and classical communication M , should ap-
proach nfinal. (Here 〈. . .〉M denotes the expectation value
with respect to the measurement outcome M .) General-
ized privacy amplification [27] achieves that by hashing
the corrected sifted key into a shorter key by hash func-
tions [28,29] such that we obtain the bound [27] (see [23]
for the extension to the expectation values with respect
to M)
H [〈p(x|M)〉M ] ≥ nfinal − log2 (2nfinal〈pc[p(x|M)]〉M + 1) .
(2)
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Here pc[p(x|M)] is a measure of the a posteriori proba-
bility on the corrected sifted key x of length nsif . This
measure is the collision probability, defined as
pc[p(x|M)] =
∑
x
p2(x|M) . (3)
If we choose the length of the final key to be
nfinal = nsif(1− τ1)− nS , (4)
the estimate becomes, after a further simplifying estima-
tion [27],
H [〈p(x|M)〉M ] ≥ nfinal − 2
−nS
ln 2
(5)
with
τ1 = 1 +
1
nsif
log2〈pc[p(x|M)]〉M . (6)
Clearly, we can approximate an ideal secret key arbitrar-
ily close by the choice of the security parameter nS. For
long keys, only the shortening fraction τ1 needs to be
taken account of.
The above formulas show that an upper bound on the
expected collision probability leads to a lower bound on
the Shannon information. Such bounds have been pro-
vided for the BB84 protocol in [23,24,32] for various sce-
narios. We concentrate here on the case that the errors
in the sifted key are corrected (as opposed to discard-
ing the corresponding bits) using the bi-directional error
correction procedures. We define the collision probabil-
ity p
(1)
c (e), as a function of the error rate e in the sifted
key, for a single bit of the corrected sifted key implicitly
by 〈pc[p(x|M)]〉M =
(
p
(1)
c [e]
)nsif
and find the bound [23]
p(1)c (e) ≤
{
1
2 + 2e− 2e2 for e ≤ 1/2
1 for 1/2 ≤ e . (7)
which gives, finally,
τ1(e) ≤
{
log2
(
1 + 4e− 4e2) for e ≤ 1/2
1 for 1/2 ≤ e . (8)
The estimate is valid for uni-directional protocols as well
since the additional information flow to Eve during bi-
directional error correction takes, apparently, the form
of a spoiling information in the sense of [27]. As pointed
out in [23], we have to be careful in dealing with am-
biguous detections, for example clicks in both detectors
monitoring orthogonal polarizations. A way to deal with
that is to randomly assign a bit value to those events.
Discarding those events would open a loophole for the
eavesdropper.
C. Gain formula for single photon signals
We can summarize the effects of error correction and
privacy amplification by a gain formula for the limit of
long keys. It is given by
Gsingle (9)
=
1
2
pexp {1− τ1 + f [e] (e log2 e+ (1− e) log2(1− e))} .
Bob’s detector is triggered with probability pexp, taking
into account channel losses and imperfect detection effi-
ciencies, and in half of the cases the signal is entered into
the sifted key. From the length of the sifted key we have
to deduct the cost of error correction and of privacy am-
plification. The resulting rate for a lossless transmission,
pexp = 1, and ideal error correction, f [e] = 1, is shown in
figure 1. From there it becomes clear that the maximal
tolerated error rate for this approach is around 11%.
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FIG. 1. Gain of secure bits per time slot as a function of
the observed error rate e for an ideal channel for single-photon
signals and ideal error correction.
III. EXTENSION TO MULTI-PHOTON SOURCES
WITH IDEAL POLARIZATIONS
To generalize the results of the previous section to real-
istic signal sources we first need to consider which signals
states we can generate. We find that the typical sources
show a simple structure which allows us to describe the
optimal eavesdropping strategy. As a consequence, we
can bound Eve’s collision probability using the results
derived for single photon signals.
A. Realistic signal sources
The signal sources described here generate the signal
from some state in one polarization mode by changing its
polarization to one of the four BB84 polarization modes.
3
Typically, there will be no fixed relation between the
optical phase of subsequent signals. As a result, Eve
“sees” the phase averaged form of the signals [20] which
take the form of a mixture of Fock states in the chosen
polarization mode. (The off-diagonal terms average out
to zero.) This observation, in fact, simplifies the analysis
of security.
It should be noted that even if the source should bear
some phase relation between subsequent pulses, this re-
lation can be destroyed by including a phase randomizer
which selects at random an optical phase for each sig-
nal. This is needed, for example, for the “plug and play
scheme” by the Geneva group [6]. Note that the so-called
phase encoding [3] is basically equivalent to the the po-
larization encoding. This is so because the four BB84
polarizations can be expressed, mathematically, as a rel-
ative phase between two modes. Phase encoding uses the
relative phase between two spatially separated modes (in
the same fiber and the same polarization mode). They
are therefore equivalent. However, in some implementa-
tions one of the spatial mode pulses has a bigger ampli-
tude to implement some kind of strong reference pulse
for an interference in Bob’s detector, as proposed in the
two state protocol [33] and the “4+2” protocol [18]. The
security analysis presented here does not apply to these
set-ups.
B. Estimation of the collision probability
We have seen above that for the signal sources inves-
tigated here, the signals are mixtures of Fock states in
the chosen polarization mode. It turns out that Eve can
split the photon number of each signal containing two
or more photons by extracting one or more photons out
of the signal such that both parts retain their original
polarization. (See appendix A.) This can be achieved
by interactions of the Jaynes-Cummings type which are
preceded by a quantum non-demolition measurement of
the total photon number of the signal. This stands not in
contrast to the statement of Yuen [19] that it is not pos-
sible to extract a photon from an arbitrary state, since
here we are talking only about states with known total
photon number, and where all photons are in a single,
though unknown, mode. On the other hand, it is unclear
what it would mean for other states to extract a photon
such that the extracted photon and the remaining states
have an unaltered polarization. Eve can perform a mea-
surement on her photons after receiving the information
about the polarization basis of the signals, and she there-
fore will know the bit-value of these signals. On the other
hand, she does not cause any errors on Bob’s side, since
the photons arrive there with the original polarization.
We can summarize this in the statement that the colli-
sion probability on each bit in the sifted key which stems
from a multi-photon signal is equal to 1, and all errors in
the sifted key are due to eavesdropping on single photon
signals contribution to the sifted key.
The collision probability for the sifted key factorizes
into the product of collision probabilities for each bit.
If we know an upper bound on the number m of multi-
photon signals contributing to the sifted key, then we
can estimate the collision probability on the sifted key of
length nsif by the single bit collision probabilities for sin-
gle photon signals p
(1)
c and that for multi-photon signals
p
(m)
c = 1 as
pc ≤
(
p(m)c
)m (
p(1)c
)nsif−m
=
(
p(1)c
)nsif−m
. (10)
The value of the error rate at which p
(1)
c from Eq. 7 is
evaluated, has to be rescaled since all errors are assumed
to stem from eavesdropping on the single-photon signals.
We therefore find
pc ≤
(
p(1)c
[
e
nsif
nsif −m
])nsif−m
, (11)
which gives the fraction of the key which has to be dis-
carded during privacy amplification as
τ
(m)
1 (e
(1)) = 1 +
nsif −m
nsif
log2 p
(1)
c
[
e
nsif
nsif −m
]
. (12)
The number of multi-photon bits contributing to the
sifted key can be bounded once we know the source char-
acteristic in the form of probabilities S0, S1, and Sm
for the signal to contain zero, one, or more than one
photon. Eve will use all multi-photon signals while she
suppresses partly single-photon signal to obtain the de-
sired fraction pexp of signals successfully detected by Bob.
Therefore the expectation value for the number m of
signals stemming from multi-photon signals is given by
〈m〉 = Smntot, where ntot is the total number of signals
sent by Alice. We can use a theorem by Hoeffding [34] to
relate the expected number of multi-photon signals 〈m〉
to the actually created number of such signals m for a
key of length nsif with some probability. The statement
is that the inequality
|〈m〉 −m| ≤ δ ntot (13)
for some chosen value of δ holds with a probability P >
1−exp (−2ntotδ2). This means, that we can choose m =
〈m〉 since we deal in this article only with the limit of
large keys. For experimental realizations, however, one
has to keep an eye on the choice of δ which might be
rather small. Then ntot has to be quite large to obtain a
reasonable value for P . More discussion concerning the
statistical issue can be found in [23].
C. Gain formula for realistic signal sources
The gain formula for the considered signal sources is
now given by
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G(multi) =
1
2
ppost pexp
{
nsif − 〈m〉
nsif
(14)
×
(
1− log2
[
1 + 4e
nsif
nsif − 〈m〉 − 4
(
e
nsif
nsif − 〈m〉
)2])
+ f [e] [e log2 e+ (1− e) log2(1− e)]
}
.
Here I included a factor ppost as the post-selection prob-
ability of the signal. We need this for a consistent pre-
sentation of the results using parametric downconversion,
since there Alice performs a post-selection for each time
slot. The quantities pexp, ntot, and S0, S1, and Sm re-
fer always to the post-selected signals to emphasise the
view that post-selection is the state preparation. All
parameters needed to evaluate this expression are actu-
ally observables of the experiment. The value of nsif is
agreed between Alice and Bob, the value of ntot becomes
known to them during the key generation and leads to
pexp =
nsif
ntot
. The value of e are directly observed. The
value of Sm is indirectly measurable in Alice’s labora-
tory and leads to 〈m〉 = Smntot. We can reformulate the
expression for the gain as
G(multi) =
1
2
ppost pexp
{
pexp − Sm
pexp
(15)
×
(
1− log2
[
1 + 4e
pexp
pexp − Sm − 4
(
e
pexp
pexp − Sm
)2])
+f [e] [e log2 e+ (1− e) log2 (1− e)]
}
so that it is expressed entirely in measurable quantities.
In this form we can use it to estimate the gain for a run-
ning experiment without having to implement the classi-
cal procedures of error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion.
IV. SIMULATION FOR EXPERIMENTS
To simulate the gain we can obtain from an exper-
imental set-up, we need to model the photon number
distribution of the source in more detail. Here we need
more than the three probabilities S0, S1, and Sm since
the probability pexp depends on the photon number dis-
tribution within the multi-photon signals as well. Fur-
thermore, we need to model the expected error rate of
the experiment.
In my calculation I take account of the photon num-
ber distribution of the signal source and the losses in the
quantum channel. Bob’s detection unit varies in different
set-ups by the number of detectors etc. The parameters
entering the calculation here are the single-photon detec-
tion efficiency ηB and the dark count rate dB, both given
for the whole detection unit. The dark count rate is mea-
sured as dark count detections per time slot, i.e. gating
window.
A. General formulas
The probability pexp that Bob detects a signal has two
sources, one coming from the detection of signal photons
psignalexp , the other from the dark counts of the detectors
pdarkexp . The combination gives
pexp = p
signal
exp + p
dark
exp − psignalexp pdarkexp (16)
where I assume that the dark counts are independent
of the signal photon detection. Let Si be the probability
that the source sends i photons, then the probability that
Bob’s detector is triggered by a signal photon is given as a
function of the detection efficiency ηB and a transmission
efficiency of the channel ηT by
psignalexp =
∞∑
i=1
Si
i∑
l=1
(
i
l
)
(ηBηT )
l
(1− ηBηT )i−l . (17)
The dark count distribution is simply given by
pdarkexp = dB . (18)
The error rate stems, again, from two sources. The first
is an error rate for the detected signal photons, which is
due to alignment errors or fringe visibility. The proba-
bility of an error per time slot due to this mechanism is
modeled by perroralign = c p
signal
exp with a constant c. The dark
count contribution to the same error probability is given
by perroralign =
1
2dB since a dark count will result at random
in one of the two measurement results for Bob, so that in
half of the cases an error is created. Then the error rate
in the sifted key is modeled by
e ≈ c p
signal
exp +
1
2dB
pexp
(19)
in a regime where coincidences between dark counts and
real counts can be neglected. For optical fibers, the losses
in the quantum channel can be derived from the loss
coefficient α measured in dB/km, the length of the fiber
l in km and the loss in Bob’s detection unit Lc in dB as
ηT = 10
−αl+Lc
10 . (20)
Typical values for the fibre loss α in the three telecom-
munication windows at 0.8µm, 1.3µm, and 1.5µm are 2.5
dB/km, 0.35 dB/km, and 0.2 dB/km respectively.
B. Weak coherent pulses
In most experiments for qkd the signal source is a
strongly attenuated laser pulse. The sources uses in typ-
ically experiments, e.g. laser diodes, emit pulses which
optical phases are set at random by the initiating spon-
taneous emission. Therefore these sources fall into the
category for which our arguments apply.
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The photon number is Poisson distributed with Si =
exp(−µ)µi/i! and mean photon number µ. Therefore we
obtain
Sm = 1− (1 + µ) exp(−µ) (21)
psignalexp = 1− exp(−ηBηTµ) (22)
which allow us together with the Eq. (15-20) and a post-
selection probability ppost = 1 to calculate the expected
gain per time slot of an experiment with weak coherent
pulses.
We evaluate the resulting gain rate using parameter
sets taken from the literature. (See table II.) When we
TABLE II. Parameters for quantum key distribution ex-
periments taken from the literature.
BT 8 BT 13 G 13 KTH 15
[4] [3] [8] [11]
wavelength [nm] 830 1300 1300 1550
channel loss [dB/km] α 2.5 0.38 0.32 0.2
receiver loss [dB] Lc 8 5 3.2 1
signal error rate [%] e 1 0.8 0.14 1
dark counts [per slot] dB 5× 10
−8 10−5 8.2× 10−5 2× 10−4
detection efficiency [%] ηB 50 11 17 18
keep all parameters fixed and vary the expected photon
number of the signal, we obtain a gain curve with a clear
maximum. Furthermore, if the the photon number is
too low, we cannot obtain a positive gain because of the
dark count rate of Bob’s detector. On the other hand,
for large photon numbers we cannot obtain a positive
gain because of the high multi-photon probability for the
signals. We concentrate on the optimal choice of the
expected photon number which yields the maximal gain
rate. Now we can vary the length of the transmission line.
The resulting graphs are shown in figure 2. We see that
the gain rate drops roughly exponentially with the length
of the transmission before it starts to drop faster due to
the increasing influence of the dark counts. The initial
behavior is mainly due to the multi-photon component
of the signals while the influence of the error-correction
part is small. In this regime we can bound the gain by
the approximation
G ≤ 1
2
(pexp − Sm) (23)
=
1
2
{(1 + µ) exp(−µ)− exp(−ηBηTµ)} . (24)
This expression is optimized if we choose µ = µoptm
which fulfills
ηB ηT exp(−ηBηTµoptm)− µoptm exp(−µoptm) = 0 . (25)
Since for a realistic setup we expect that ηBηT ≪ 1, we
find µoptm ≈ ηBηT . In this approximation we find the
approximate upper bound
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FIG. 2. Weak coherent pulses: The rate of secure key
bits per time slot for realistic parameters described in the
literature. (See table II). The rate needs to be multiplied
with the repetition rate of the apparatus to obtain the true
rate per second. Note that the main effect for the shown
experiments is the different absorption rate of that fiber at
the respective wavelength. Furthermore, these experiments
were not optimized with respect to the gain presented here.
G ≈ 1
4
η2B η
2
T . (26)
As the distance increases and the influence of the dark
counts and the error correction grows, this approximation
is no longer valid. Instead, we find in the numerical sim-
ulations that the optimal photon number is even lower.
Note that in the real experiments much higher photon
number have been used. Typically, these higher photon
numbers do not allow secure key distribution over the
reported distances.
The approximate situation described above illuminates
another interesting feature. As noted in [20], technical
limitations on detectors limit the distance over which we
can perform secure qkd with weak coherent pulses, and
the presented security proof is in accordance with it. This
limit can be stretched as the technology improves. How-
ever, the obtained distance is only one characteristic of
a setup. Another is the obtained rate. We find that the
gain rate per time slot is limited already by the use of
the Poissonian photon number distribution and the loss
in the optical fiber.
We can evaluate Eqn. (26) for perfect detection de-
vices and get a bound 1 shown in Fig. 3 in the case of
the KTH set-up. The gap between bound 1 and the ex-
act result shows how much room is left for improvements
of Bob’s detection apparatus. The bounds 2 and 3 take
into account in addition to the fiber loss the loss in Bob’s
detection device and the detection efficiency. We find
that bound 3 is already a good approximation to the
exact results, at least for short and medium distances.
This shows that the multi-photon aspect is for these dis-
tances the dominating effect compared to the effect of
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FIG. 3. The optimal rate for the the scenario of [11] (KTH
15). Bound 1 describes the optimal possible rate given the use
of Poissonian photon number distribution and the loss of the
quantum channel. Bound 2 takes into account additionally
the given loss in Bob’s receiver, while bound 3 even includes
the detection inefficiency of Bob’s detector. Therefore, bound
3 represents the approximation (23).
error correction and the influence of eavesdropping on
single-photon signals, which are responsible for the gap
between bound 3 and the exact curve. In order to com-
pare the performance of different setups, one would need
to multiply the gain rate with the signal repetition rate
of the set-up to obtain the rate of secret bits per second.
This repetition rate may be vastly different for some ap-
plications, so that the gain rate shown in Fig.2 is only a
starting point in optimizing the secure bit rate for a spe-
cific application. However, it shows clearly the variation
of the performance as the distance varies, including the
maximal possible distance.
C. Parametric downconversion for triggering
The results of the previous section illustrates that the
coverable distance for qkd is limited. As shown explicitly
in [20], this distance can be increased by the usage of
other signal sources, especially by the use of parametric
downconversion. Note, however, that it has been shown
there that even perfect single photon sources will lead
to a limited coverable distance due to Bob’s dark count
rate.
I will discuss here only the use of parametric downcon-
version (pdc) as a triggering mechanism, although more
sophisticated techniques using EPR states are possible.
For that we consider the non-degenerate parametric am-
plifier described by the parameter χ as the product of the
coupling constant and the interaction time of the process.
This creates the two-mode state [35]
|Ψ〉 = (coshχ)−1
∞∑
n=0
(tanhχ)n|n, n〉 . (27)
Alice monitors the first mode with a detector described
by detection efficiency ηA and dark count rate dA. Only
coincidences between Alice’s and Bob’s detector will be
taken into account when forming the sifted key. For a
low dark count rate and a small parameter χ (note that
sinh2 χ is the expected photon number in one mode) we
can neglect coincidences between dark counts and detec-
tion events and associate Alice’s detection event with the
POM element
Eclick = dA|0〉〈0|+
∞∑
n=1
(1− (1− ηA)n)|n〉〈n| . (28)
The signal state conditioned on Alice’s detection event is
then given by
ρclick =
1
ppost
TrA (Eclick|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) (29)
=
1
ppost
dA
cosh2 χ
|0〉〈0|
+
1
ppost
∞∑
n=1
(1− (1 − ηA)n) tanh
2n χ
cosh2 χ
|n〉〈n|
with the post-selection probability as normalization fac-
tor
ppost =
dA
cosh2 χ
+
∞∑
n=1
(1− (1 − ηA)n) tanh
2n χ
cosh2 χ
(30)
=
dA
cosh2 χ
+
1
cosh2 χ
(
1
1− tanh2 χ −
1
1− (1 − ηA) tanh2 χ
)
.
This gives us the photon number distribution of the sig-
nals which are obtained from this seed state by polar-
ization rotation. From the photon number distribution
we can calculate Sm by summation and p
signal
exp , via the
photodetection formula [35] as,
Sm = 1− 1
ppost cosh
2 χ
(
dA + ηA tanh
2 χ
)
(31)
psignalexp =
1
ppost cosh
2 χ
(32)
×
∞∑
n=1
[1− (1− ηA)n] [1− (1− ηT ηB)n] tanh2n χ
=
1
ppost cosh
2 χ
[
1
1− tanh2 χ
− 1
1− (1− ηTηB) tanh2 χ
− 1
1− (1− ηA) tanh2 χ
+
1
1− (1− ηA)(1 − ηTηB) tanh2 χ
]
.
As in the case of the wcp scenario, we are now in the
position to calculate the gain rate of a setup from ex-
perimental parameters. The simulations use experimen-
tal values for the transmission line and detectors which
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are the same as in the wcp case. There are two differ-
ent scenarios: Either the non-degenerate downconversion
produces photons at the same frequency, or one can use
downconversion with different frequencies such that the
frequency of Alice’s photon has a wavelength convenient
for detection, while the other photon’s wavelength falls
into one of the three telecommunication windows for opti-
mal propagation along the fiber or open air. To illustrate
the calculation we assumed the situation where one mode
is adapted to the 800 nm detectors of the British Tele-
com experiment, while the signal mode is emitted in one
of the four modes used already for the wcp case. The
results of this hypothetical experiment is shown in Fig. 4.
We find an increase of the covered distance against the
use of the wcp source, but this happens at the expense
of a lower rate per signal.
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FIG. 4. Parametric downconversion as triggering device:
The rate of secure key bits per time slot for realistic pa-
rameters described in the literature. The triggering mode
is adapted to the 800 nm detector of the BT experiment. The
signal mode is adapted to one of the four studied cases. (See
table II). The rate needs to be multiplied with the repetition
rate of the apparatus to obtain the true rate per second.
To understand the decrease of the rate, we can now
bound the maximal gain per time slot in correspondence
to the calculation for weak coherent states. It is now
convenient to introduce the expected photon number µ =
sinh2 χ. In the optimal case, Alice’s triggering detector
is perfect (ηA = 1 and dA = 0), and we neglect the
negative contribution of privacy amplification and error
correction. Then we find, again using η := ηBηT ,
Sm = ppost
µ2
(1 + µ)2
(33)
pexp = ppost
ηµ
1 + ηµ
(34)
so that we find for the gain
G ≤ 1
2
µ
(
η
1 + ηµ
− µ
(1 + µ)2
)
. (35)
Now the optimal mean photon number µopt satisfies
− 2µopt − 2η2µ3opt + η(1 + 3µopt − µ2opt + µ3opt) = 0
(36)
which leads for small values of η to µ ≈ 12η. In the same
limit the gain rate is approximated by
G ≈ 1
8
η2 . (37)
This bounds the obtainable rate for the case that Bob’s
detectors are perfect, so that η → ηT . We find that
here weak coherent states have a potential gain rate per
time slot which is twice as big as the one of parametric
down conversion. The reason is that the photon number
distribution for pdc sources is basically thermal, which
shows a higher multi-photon contribution compared to a
Poisson distribution with the same mean photon num-
ber. For practical realization, however, a factor of two
is not that significant, and the gap between gain rate of
secure bits with imperfect tools is still by orders of magni-
tude separated from this limit. Therefore the question re-
mains open, which technology allows a simpler approach
to higher rates.
Note that one would need to take into account the loss
occurring when Alice couples the photon for Bob into a
fiber. This loss can be easily incorporated in this calcu-
lations since the resulting photon number distribution of
the signals can be obtained using the photon count for-
mulas. Here, however, we do not study this additional
parameter. The corresponding formulas are given in ap-
pendix B.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I presented a security proof of quantum
cryptography which is restricted to individual attacks.
This proof takes into account the non-ideal signal sources
and detectors. Moreover, it allows to compare the per-
formance for different arrangements with respect to the
overall gain rate. In this sense it can help to decide which
type of source to use, for example weak coherent pulses
or downconversion, depending on the available technol-
ogy and the task fixing, for example, wavelength and
distance. For existing experiments, it allows to find the
optimal mean photon number of the source and the op-
timal working point for Bob’s detectors.
We found that the use of pdc sources with a sim-
ple triggering mechanism does not increase the overall
rate of secure bits, but it allows to increase the distance
which can be covered by experiments. The rate could be
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improved by a more sophisticated detection mechanism,
where Alice could, at least partly, determine the number
of pairs produced in a time slot. Even if this mechanism
does not work perfectly, it would improve the rate and
distance.
Our examples show that the use of wcp sources gives,
typically, higher rates per time slot than the use of pdc
sources, as long as the distance is not too big. I would
like to point out again, that in the end the total rate,
that is the rate per time slot times the repetition rate of
the set-up, is what counts. It depends therefore on the
bottle-neck of the set-up which design can be made the
fastest.
The problem of non-ideal sources in the presence of
loss is known since 1995. There have been proposals
to use strong reference pulses in the two-state protocol
[14] and the BB84 protocol [18], but so far these ideas
have not been implemented. The reference pulses make
it more difficult for Eve to block signals, since in those
schemes Bob measures the interference of the strong ref-
erence pulse with the weak signal, so that the absence
of the weak signal will lead to an error in half of the
cases. I would like to point out, that the security of this
scheme has not been fully analyzed yet even for individ-
ual attacks, but this scheme is certainly the hope for the
future to improve the here analyzed BB84 protocol.
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APPENDIX A: PHOTON NUMBER SPLITTING
The photon number splitting idea has been presented
already in [20]. Here I want to provide more details. To
perform photon number splitting, Eve performs a quan-
tum non-demolition measurement on the total photon
number in both polarization modes. As a result the signal
is now described by a n-photon state in the unknown and
undisturbed signal polarization, and the photon number
n is known to Eve.
The task is now to find a unitary transformation U
(n)
PNS,
which depends on the value of n, such that precisely one
photon from the two signal polarization modes ai is trans-
ferred to two additional polarization modes bi which are
in Eve’s hand. The polarization of either part should be
equal to the original one. This means we require that the
two signals of the first polarization basis (+) transform
as
U
(n)
PNS|n, 0, 0, 0〉+ = |n− 1, 0, 1, 0〉+ (A1)
U
(n)
PNS|0, n, 0, 0〉+ = |0, n− 1, 0, 1〉+ .
Here the components of the state vector | . . .〉+ corre-
spond to the photon number occupation of the modes
a1, a2, b1, b2 respectively. The requirement for the two
signal states of the second polarization basis (×) is eas-
ily formulated if we choose the mode representation de-
fined by the operators a± = 1/
√
2(a1 ± a2) and b± =
1/
√
2(b1 ± b2). The state vector | . . .〉× now denotes the
occupation number in the modes a+, a−, b+, b−. We re-
quire, that
U
(n)
PNS|n, 0, 0, 0〉× = |n− 1, 0, 1, 0〉× (A2)
U
(n)
PNS|0, n, 0, 0〉× = |0, n− 1, 0, 1〉× .
Indeed, a transformation U
(n)
PNS with these properties
can be found [36]. Eve uses an interaction described by
a Jaynes-Cummings Hamiltonian
H
(1)
JC
= λ(a†1σ1 + a1σ
†
1 + a
†
2σ2 + a2σ
†
2)
to connect the signal modes to a three level system with
one ground state |g〉 and two upper states |ei〉 with
atomic excitation operators σ†
i
(i = 1, 2) [36]. (For a
review of the Jaynes-Cummings model see [37].) The
system is initially prepared in the ground state. Af-
ter an interaction time t = pi
2
√
nλ
, which depends on n,
the first two signal states transform into |n, 0〉+|g〉 →
|n−1, 0〉+|e1〉 and |0, n〉+|g〉 → |0, n−1〉+|e2〉. The same
dynamics involving two additional photonic modes, b1
and b2, and the Hamiltonian
H
(2)
JC
= λ(b†1σ1 + b1σ
†
1 + b
†
2σ2 + b2σ
†
2)
transfers (after interaction time t˜ = pi2λ) the excitation
to a photon in the original polarization into the modes
bi. In total we have then achieved the transformations
(A1) while the three-level system factors out. As shown,
this mechanism works fine for the first two signal states.
To see that it works for the other states as well note
that we can introduce a new description of the three level
system with the superpositions of the upper levels as new
excited states so that σ± = 1/
√
2(σ1 ± σ2) are the new
atomic operators. Then we find that the Hamiltonians,
written with these new atomic operators and with the
photonic operators in the base (×), have the formH(1)
JC
=
λ(a†+σ+ + a+σ
†
+ + a
†
−σ− + a−σ
†
−) and H
(2)
JC
= λ(b†+σ+ +
b+σ
†
++b
†
−σ−+b−σ
†
−). We see, the Hamiltonians are form
invariant under the the above transformations, and it
follows that this scheme performs the mapping of (A2) as
well. In general, this scheme is able to split one photon off
any n-photon state with definite polarization, regardless
what this polarization may be.
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APPENDIX B: pdc WITH FINITE COUPLING
EFFICIENCY
In this appendix I provide the straightforward derived
formulas for the case where we use a parametric down-
conversion source for the triggering of the signal, and the
signal travelling to Bob couples only with a finite effi-
ciency ηC into the fiber. All losses on Alice’s side which
cannot be accessed by Eve can be incorporated into this
efficiency. Conditioned on a click in Alice’s triggering
detector we find the following results:
ppost =
dA
cosh2 χ
(B1)
+
1
cosh2 χ
(
1
1− tanh2 χ −
1
1− (1− ηA) tanh2 χ
)
S0 =
1
ppost cosh
2 χ
(
dA +
1
1− (1− ηC) tanh2 χ
(B2)
− 1
1− (1 − ηC)(1− ηA) tanh2 χ
)
S1 =
ηC tanh
2 χ
ppost cosh
2 χ
(B3)
×
(
1
1− (1 − ηC) tanh2 χ
− 1− ηA
1− (1− ηC)(1 − ηA) tanh2 χ
)
(B4)
SM = 1− S0 − S1 (B5)
pexp =
1
ppost cosh
2 χ
[
1
1− tanh2 χ (B6)
− 1
1− (1− ηTηCηB) tanh2 χ
− 1
1− (1 − ηA) tanh2 χ
+
1
1− (1− ηA)(1− ηTηCηB) tanh2 χ
]
.
With these quantities we can, as before, determine the
optimal gain for a given setup.
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